This paper considers a loss system with a fixed budget for servers. The system owner's problem is to choose the price, and the number and quality of the servers, which maximize its profits, subject to a budget constraint. We deal with identical and different service rates, preemptive and non-preemptive policies. We present optimal solutions for all ρ larger than zero. In addition, when the policy is preemptive, we show that the total service time of a customer that enters the slowest server distributes hyper-exponential with expectation equal to the average service rate, independent of the allocation of the capacity.
Introduction
The widespread view is that combining queues yields lower average waiting time. Some proofs appeared in literature (see, for example, [33] and the references therein). Other perspectives were discussed by Rothkopf and Rech [33] who present some cases which have disadvantages to pooling queues into a single queue. An interesting related question that arises in a single queue system with a total service capacity µ is how many servers to choose and how to allocate the capacity among them, in order to maximize the profit of the system. Of course, if the system allows an infinite queue, it is best to allocate the whole capacity to a single server. In this paper we consider the other extreme, and ask whether capacity pooling is optimal in a loss system that has no waiting buffer, and when all servers are busy, newly arriving customers abandon the system.
Literature review
Capacity management has been studied in many contexts, and several applications are described in Schweitzer and Seidmann [38] . Models of capacity allocation assume that there is a fixed capacity to be allocated among service stations with independent demands, in order to optimize some performance measure. The literature on capacity allocation can be partitioned into discrete models of optimal allocations of servers among multi-service stations, and models where fraction of the total capacity allocated to each station is a continuous decision variable. The first group includes Rolfe [32] , Stecke and Solberg [36] , Shanthikumar and Yao [35] , Dallery and Stecke [11] , Green and Guha [14] , Hillier and So [17] , Hung and Posner [19] , Zhang, Berman, Marcotte, and Verter [42] .
The present paper belongs to the second group, and we now describe this literature. Kleinrock [21] found the vector of service rates µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ k ) in a Jackson network, that minimizes the sojourn time per customer, subject to a budget constraint D = d k µ k , where d k is the unit cost of capacity at station k and D the total available budget. The paper also reviews earlier work on capacity assignment. Wein [39] generalized this result to general arrival and service time distributions. In a more general setting, a budget needs to be allocated among servers, and the cost of a unit of capacity is server-dependent, see for example Kleinrock [23] §5.7. Ahmadi [3] deals with the optimal capacity levels for the rides in an amusement park during different time periods subject to a budget constraint. Kostami and Ward [28] construct a heavy traffic approximation to another capacity allocation model motivated by theme park applications.
Korilis, Lazar, and Orda [26] (see also [25] ) consider a finite number of users, each wishing to minimize the expected delay of its demand by splitting it among a set of parallel heterogeneous M/M/1 servers with known service rates. The manager has available an extra amount of capacity to be allocated among the servers. The minimum total equilibrium wait in this game is obtained by allocating the additional capacity exclusively to a server which has the highest initial capacity. This result resembles ours for the case of preemptive regime (see Theorem 2.14), though for a different model. The same authors use the same model, in [27] , focusing on the way to distribute the extra capacity while avoiding the degraded performance associated with the Braess paradox. Also Shanthikumar and Xu [34] and §6 in Altman [4] consider combined routing and capacity allocation decisions, but in their models the routing is determined by the manager and not by strategic users.
Glasserman [13] considered allocating a given capacity among several items produced by a manufacturer. Production of each item follows a base-stock policy. The manufacturer's objective is to minimize holding costs subject to a service-level constraint. Similarly, Hong and Lee [18] consider the profit maximizing way of of splitting a given capacity between two servers subject to linear demand function with substitution effects, waiting costs, and lateness penalties imposed when exogenously given delay guarantees are violated. De Kok [24] considers a packaging facility whose capacity must be allocated among different package sizes.
Chao, Liu, and Zheng [10] describe a capacity allocation model motivated by health-care management. There are N service stations, and station i has dedicated nonswitchable rate of demand. There is also a stream of non-dedicated switchable customers that the manager can route to any of the stations. The manager has a fixed amount of capacity, and the problem is to compute optimal capacity allocation among the stations and state-independent probabilistic routing of the switchable customers, with respect to some service criterion like the average waiting time or loss rate.
Mandjes and Timmer [30] consider competition between two Internet providers. Each competitor has a fixed capacity which it can split among several subnetworks which differ by their capacity and price, and then each customer chooses one of the offered subnetworks, or balks. The authors examine the equilibrium outcomes of this game.
Shumsky and Zhang [37] study a multi-period capacity allocation model. Initially there is a given amount of capacity, and the decision maker sequentially allocates capacity after observing demand within each period.
Almeida, Almeida, Ardagna, Cunha, Francalanci, and Trubian [2] compute the optimal admission of multi-class demand and allocation of a given capacity among the dedicated servers serving each class, when value is generated from a customer only if its sojourn time does not exceed the service level agreement of its class. [41] analyze capacity allocation in a Markovian queue. The system operator has a fixed capacity to be split among N users. User i dedicates the capacity allocated to it to serve its demand. Its delay sensitivity is unknown to the system operator, and the allocation of capacity is done through a bidding mechanism. Maglaras [29] considers a fluid approximation model to a multi-class dynamic control queueing model. In this model, jobs are processed, prices are set, and capacity is allocated dynamically to optimize the fluid model along its transient trajectory from any initial position till the buffers empty. Altman and
Yolken and Bambos
Başar [5] consider fluid approximation in a single server queue where each of a finite number of customers obtains a quota for its demand. The total quota allocation equals the server's capacity, and the customers dynamically control their demand. There is a desired length for the queue and two types of penalties. One associated with individual deviation from the allocated quota, and the other one associated with aggregate deviation of the queue length from the desired level. Akan, Ata, and Olsen [1] consider another fluid approximation model of allocating capacity to multiple classes of heterogeneous customers, but allow occasional dynamic changes in the allocation to fully utilize the service capacity.
Chen, Su, and Zhao [9] analyze a capacity allocation game where retailers choose their capacity orders strategically from a single supplier, and if the orders exceed the supplier's capacity then the supplier divides its capacity among the retailers using a proportional allocation scheme.
A main difference between these models and ours is that they assume that customers routing is independent of the system's state, whereas we assume that an arriving customer joins the fastest available server. We also consider the option of reassigning a customer when a faster server completes service. A similar approach has been followed by Xu and Shanthikumar [40] who compute the optimal admission control policy when servers are indexed (for example, in decreasing order of their service rate) and a new customer is assigned to the lowest indexed available customer, if one exists. Similar to most of the literature on routing demand to servers (see, for example, Bell and Stidham [7] ), they do not allow reassigning customers.
Reassignment is allowed in by Kim, Ahn, and Righter [20] but their model assumes a lastcome first-served regime.
Overview
In this paper, we consider an M/G/k/k loss system with arrival rate λ and a fixed budget µ for servers. The decision of the system's owner is the price and the number and quality (as reflected by service rate) of the servers in order to maximize its profits. For a server with rate µ 0 , let c(µ 0 ) be the cost per unit of time. As in most models, we assumed that c(µ 0 ) = cµ 0 without dependence on the utilization µ 0 and in this case, we further assume that c = 1 w.l.o.g.
Throughout the article, we use the notation, h(n) = Θ(g(n)) if there exist k 1 , k 2 > 0 and
First, we consider identical servers and the problem of how many servers to choose in order to maximize the profit. We present a function f (depending on ρ = λ/µ) and show that the a optimal number k * of servers satisfies
for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ∞ and ν e = Rµ C .
In particular, we consider a large scale service system. The arrive and service rates λ (n) , µ (n) increase to infinity together, i.e., ρ (n) → 1. In this case, we show that the optimal number of servers k (n) grows as n 2/3 and individual service rate grows as n 1/3 . This regime is surprising and belongs to a new collection of queue regimes is first revealed by Atar (2011) as we describe below. A collection of large scale queue systems is called a heavy traffic regime if ρ (n) → 1 under a second order condition (see [6] and references therein). In the first common regime, named the conventional regime (see Chen and Yao [8] ), the number of the servers does not change. In contrast, the regime introduced by Halfin and Whitt (HW) considers systems with a large number of servers, while the individual service rates do not change ( [16] ). Atar [6] introduces the α-parametrization. To describe it, he discussed a single-class queueing model M/M/N with parameters λ n , µ n and N n depending on some scaling parameter n. Let the external arrival rate increase as Θ(n). Given some α ∈ [0, 1], assume that the number of servers is Θ(n α ), while each of the individual service rates scales as n 1−α . In addition, let a suitable critical load condition hold. Then the extremal cases α = 0 and α = 1 correspond to the conventional and HW regimes, respectively. As we explained above, the optimal regime in our model is appropriate to the case α = 2/3.
When the system allows different service rates, we focus on an M/M/k/k loss system. Since the associated birth-death equations are already complicated even when the number of servers is rather small, we solve them explicitly for the case k = 2 and check k = 3 numerically. For k = 2 we show that if ν e ≤ f (3) then the optimal solution is with identical servers. But for ν e is sufficiently large, the optimal solution is with different capacities. For k = 3 we show that identical servers are optimal when ν e ≤ f (4). We note that f (4) is a rather large number (depending on ρ).
Finally, we deal with a preemptive policy which means that if a server i becomes idle, every customer who currently obtains service from a server that is slower than server i is moved to the next faster server. We prove an intriguing result about the total service time of a customer that enters the server, namely, it is a hyper-exponential random with expectation equal to the average service rate, independent of the allocation of the capacity, i.e., µ/k, where k is the number of servers. The profit grows when the total budget is allocated to fewer servers while other servers are used as standby positions (with rate 0). In particular, the optimal solution is obtained for k − 1 servers with rate zero and a unique server with rate µ. In addition, the optimal number k of servers is equal to the social profit maximizing threshold value in Naor's
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The setting and main results appear in Section 2. Section 3 provides some directions for future research. Finally, Section 4 contains the proofs.
Model description and results
Consider an M/G/k/k loss system. Each arriving customer is assigned to an available server.
However, if all servers are busy, the customer abandons the system. We make the following assumptions:
1. The arrival rate and total service rate are λ and µ, respectively.
2. Customers are risk neutral, maximizing the expected net benefit. The joining customer can observe the service rates before joining.
3. The cost to a customer is C per unit of time (while he is in the system). The customer's benefit from completed service is R.
4. The system's owner has total available capacity µ. Its decision variables are the number of servers k, the service rates
, and the admission fee p.
Identical service rates
In this section, we assume that the service rates must be equal, i.e., µ i = µ/k, i = 1, . . . , k, and we consider the optimal number of servers, k * . Consider a fixed k. The customer's strategy is to enter the system if R ≥ C µ/k + p. In order to achieve optimal profit for a given k, the strategy of the system's owner is to increase the admission fee to the maximum level such that the customer still want to be served, i.e.,
The profit of the system's owner is
where ρ = λ/µ, ν e = Rµ C , and π k is the steady-state probability of k busy servers in the M/G/k/k queue. The probability that all servers are busy is given by Erlang's loss formula: (see, for example, [22] page 105)
Substituting π k in (1) gives,
It is easy to see that if k grows, the admission fee p decreases and, by Lemma 2.1, 1 − π k becomes larger. Namely, there are opposing influences on the profit Z(k). Hence, given ν e and ρ, it is interesting to find the profit maximizing number k * of servers.
First, we present a lemma that argues that if the number of servers grows, the probability π k that all servers are busy becomes smaller (all proofs are given in Section 4).
The following theorem presents the optimal number of servers for profit maximizing. To do this, we need to consider the function
for n = k + 1,
and for k + 2 ≤ n ≤ 2k,
We have verified numerically that g(k, n) > 0 for k = 1, . . . , 50 (see Appendix), and by Lemma 2.2, it follows that the sequence f (k) is monotone at least for these values. The following theorem exploits this property.
where k * is the solution of
Example 2.4 For example, we derive the conditions for k * = 0, 1, 2, 3 by writing the probabilities π k for k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
We get a necessary and sufficient condition for k = 0 to be optimal (i.e., it is better to close the service system):
for k = 1 to be optimal:
for k = 2 to be optimal:
and for k = 3 to be optimal:
Now, we consider a collection of loss systems such that in the nth system, the total arrive and service rates are
and λ = µ.
This collection is called a large scale service market. In our case, of course,
The optimal number of servers k (n) satisfies the conditions f (k (n) ) < ν
For ρ = 1, by the proof of 2.1, the sequence {π k · k 1 2 } is bounded and
(see (20) ). From the proof of Lemma 2.2 and Lemma 2.1, we obtain that { π k+1 π k } is an increasing sequence and bounded above by 1 and hence converges. Therefore, the sequence of ratios of successive terms of the sequence {π k · k
, converges. The inequality
in the asymptotic behavior. Hence,
(the equality is between sets). Hence, the optimal number of servers k (n) grows as n 2/3 and individual service rate grows as n 1/3 .
Non-preemptive policy: different service rates
Now, we allow k servers with different rates, which we denote µ 1 ≥ µ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ k , and each arriving customer is channeled to a highest index among the available servers. We assume that the routing policy is non-preemptive, i.e., after a customer is assigned to a particular server, he is not transferred to another server. Hence, the customer's strategy is to enter the highest index available server i if R ≥
Of course, since we consider the optimal allocation, all servers are active. Therefore, µ k ≥ C R and the optimal strategy of system's owner is to set price p = R − C µ k .
Two and three servers
In fact, as we mentioned in the introduction, we deal only with two and three servers. First, we assume that one server operates with rate µ 1 , 1 2 µ < µ 1 < µ and the second server operates with rate µ 2 = µ − µ 1 . We denote the profit by Z(µ 1 , µ 2 ). Let
The following theorem argues that for all ρ and ν e ≤ f (3), the profit of a system with two identical servers is larger than a system with two different servers (for every a partition of the total capacity).
In particular, for all ρ and ν e ≤ f (3),
where
The proof of the theorem splits into three lemmas:
Lemma 2.6 Let π 2 (µ 1 , µ 2 ) be the steady state probability of both servers are busy, then
Lemma 2.7
(i) For all ρ and ν e = f (3),
(ii) For all ρ and ν e < f (3),
We now consider ν e values are larger than f (3).
Corollary 2.8
For ν e sufficiently large, the optimal solution is with µ 2 = µ 1 .
Corollary 2.9
(i) The optimal profit is obtained with
The following theorem presents a result in similar to Theorem 2.5, for the case of three
, the probability that all servers are busy. The proof will use numerical computations. Theorem 2.10 For k = 3, the profit is
In particular, for all ρ if ν e ≤ f (4),
Intermediate summary
Combining Theorems 2.3, 2.5 and 2.10, we obtain that if ν e < f (4) and the policy is nonpreemptive, the optimal solution is with identical servers. Although we do not show this result
for ν e > f (4), this result is very important. As we can see, f (4) is rather large number (for example, if ρ = 1 then f (4) = 22.43), so that in many applications, the optimal solution is with identical servers.
Theorem 2.11 Let 0 < ρ < ∞ and ν e < f (4) be given and assume that the policy is nonpreemptive. Then, the profit maximizing solution has identical service rates. The optimal number of servers is shown in Theorem 2.3 (see also Example 2.4).
Different service rates: preemptive policy
In this section we consider an M/M/k/k loss system and let µ 1 ≥ µ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ µ k be the rates of k servers where µ 1 +· · ·+µ k = µ. The routing policy is preemptive which means that if a server i becomes idle, every customer that obtains service from a slower server j, j = i + 1, i + 2, . . . , k is immediately transferred to server j − 1. Based on the assumption that all the servers are active, the optimal entry fee is R − CE(W S ) where W S is the expected total service time of a customer who begins service by the slowest server (with rate µ k ), and of course, this happens when all the other servers are also busy.
Lemma 2.12 W S is a hyper-exponential random variable and its density function is given by
where u l are parameters such that
The expected service time of a customer who joins the slowest server is easily computed in the two extreme cases:
1. If all the servers are with same rate (see Section 2.1), the expectation of a single service time with rate
2. If a unique server operates with the total rate µ and other servers operate with zero rate (thus they function as standby positions), a customer who joins the k-th server will leave the system after k service periods, and wait the expectation nod wait is k µ .
The following surprising corollary of Lemma 2.3 argues that the expectation of W S is k µ for any allocation (µ 1 , . . . , µ k ).
Theorem 2.14 Given k. Let Z(µ) be the profit of the system's owner when the rates of the k servers are given by µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ k ),
where Z(k) is the profit of a system with equal service rates as in Section 2.1. In addition, let µ * = (µ * 1 , . . . , µ * k ) be a rate vector of k servers such that µ * 1 = µ and µ * 2 , . . . , µ * k = 0. Then, Z(µ * ) is the maximum profit of the system's owner.
In this section, we dealt with a fixed number of servers k. We showed that it is best to give the total service intensity µ to a single server with k − 1 standby positions. The following corollary presents the optimal number k * of active servers, in order to maximize the profit:
where π k (µ * k ) is the probability that all servers are busy in a system with preemptive policy.
Corollary 2.15
where n r is the social profit maximizing buffer size in Naor's model [31] .
Discussion and future research
In this paper, we consider a multi-server system with non-preemptive and preemptive policy and show that optimal solutions for the quality of servers are opposite for the two policies.
Under the non-preemptive policy, the optimal solution is with identical servers. Otherwise, it is better to allocate the total rate to an one server while the other servers operated at zero service rate, and actually serve as waiting positions. Now, we present discussion and some possibilities to future researches.
1. When the policy is non-preemptive and ν e ≤ f (4), we showed that the optimal solution of the profit of the system's owner Z has identical service rates (see Section 2.2). Since the associated birth-death equations are already complicated even when the system contains two servers, we checked the case of three servers numerically. This is an interesting question: what is the optimal solution of the profit of the system's owner Z for all ν e > f (4)?.
2. Suppose that the policy is preemptive as in Section 2.3. However, the joining customer cannot observe the service rate at a server before joining (i.e., customers cannot observe the number of busy servers), but he knows the values µ 1 , . . . , µ k and whether there is an available server. Of course, the optimal strategy of the system's administrator is still to channel each arriving customer to a fastest among the available free servers. Now, the customers can compute their expected service time given that there is an available server. This may mean a probabilistic equilibrium joining strategy in which some of the customers give up service without trying -as in [12] . Hence, the effective arrival rate to the system would be P λ for some P ≤ 1, and the customers take this equilibrium value into account. The firm takes this into account while computing its profit maximizing price. As in Section 2.3, the optimal solution will be a single active server with standby positions.
3. Note that if the servers have identical capacities, or the customers cannot observe the service rate of a particular server to whom they are assigned, the optimal price will be such that the expected customer's surplus is 0. In this case the firm's strategy is socially optimal, as in [12] . However, when the servers have different capacities and customers can observe them (as Section 2.3), the price should be determined by the slowest server, leaving customers with positive surplus. In this case the firm's objective differs from the socially optimal one, and its profit maximizing price induces non optimal behavior. It is of interest to compute the socially optimal price.
Other natural extensions include endogenous determination of the budget used for paying
the servers and, of course, allowing waiting in a queue when all servers are busy.
Proof of Lemma 2.1 We denote a(k) = π
When k grows, each factor 1 − l k of a(k) grows and therefore a(k) is an increasing sequence. If ρ > 1,
In this case, the sequence a(k) is bounded increasing. Hence, a(k) converges to a finite limit a. Of course, a ≤ ρ ρ−1 . Now, for every > 0 and for every N , there exists k such that
Since a is constant, we tend to 0 and k to ∞, giving
If ρ ≤ 1, for every N , there exists k such that each of the first 2N terms are larger than 0.5, so that, a(k) > N . The sequence a(k) is unbounded increasing. Now, we consider ρ = 1 and show that a(s 2 ) = Θ(s). It is easy to see that
Hence,
and
Since the arithmetic mean larger than the geometric mean,
Let n = s 2 and l = ts + 1. By the inequality 1 − x ≤ e −x ,
By (18),
Now, we consider (19).
Therefore, for all s > 2,
Letting k = s 2 completes the proof. 2
Proof of Lemma 2.2 First, we prove that the sequence
We start to consider the ratio of the first terms,
Now, it is sufficient to prove that
Multiplying by the two denominators gives
For the proof of (21), we consider coefficients of ρ n for both sides of the inequality and show that the inequality ≤ holds for all n.
First, we consider coefficients of ρ n for all n ≤ 2k. It is sufficient to prove that for all n ≤ k,
for all n = k + 1,
and for all k + 2 ≤ n ≤ 2k,
The assumption g(k, n) > 0 completes the proof of (22)- (24) .
Second, we consider coefficients of ρ 2k+1 and ρ 2k+2 . The following equations follow from simple elementary computations:
As a consequence of these steps, the sequence
is decreasing, and therefore
is an increasing sequence. Recall that {π k } ∞ k=1 is a decreasing sequence. We obtain that
.
is an unbounded increasing sequence, and this completes the proof of Lemma 2.2.
2
Proof of Theorem 2.3 Recall eq. (1)
Let k * = argmax k {Z(k)} be the optimal number of servers. k * satisfies the following two conditions
We first derive the condition for Z(k * − 1) ≤ Z(k * ):
By Lemma 2.1, π k is a decreasing sequence. Therefore,
The condition for Z(k * ) > Z(k * + 1) is obtained by substituting k * + 1 for k * and reversing the inequality:
Hence, k * = k * completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2.6 First, we denote by π 0 (µ 1 , µ 2 ), π 1 1 (µ 1 , µ 2 ), π 2 1 (µ 1 , µ 2 ) and π 2 (µ 1 , µ 2 ), the limiting probability that the system is empty, the fast server serves a customer, the slow server serves a customer, and both servers are busy, respectively. The equations for our birth-death system are (we write in short π i = π i (µ 1 , µ 2 ))
equivalently,
The solution of the system for π 2 
which is equivalent to the claimed formula for Z(µ 1 , µ 2 ).
We denote
ρ+d . It is sufficient to prove that 0 < Z (d) for all ρ and 0 < d ≤ 1 2 . We differentiate Z (see (28) ),
We multiply the right-hand side of (29) 
We would like to show that 0 < Z . Clearly, if 0 < A(d, ρ) then 0 < Z . We use the fact that
Hence, We denote the first term of (30) by P (d, ρ) . By the definition of B(d, ρ),
Of course, 0 < P i (d, ρ), for i = 1, 2, 3 and for all ρ and 0 < d ≤ 1 2 . Now, we denote the second term of (30) by N (d, ρ) .
It is sufficient to prove that
Recall that ν = f (3) = 3 + (1+3ρ+4.5ρ 2 +4.5ρ 3 )(1+2ρ) 2ρ 2 +1.5ρ 3 = 6ρ + 4 +
. Now, the proof splits into three domains of ρ:
Hence, (using (31),
By simple calculations, we obtain 0 < 0.939ρ 3 + 2.880ρ 2 − 1.084ρ − 0.255.
Therefore,
proving (32) for 0.6 < ρ < ∞.
• For 0 < ρ ≤ 0.3, we obtain that
The following inequalities are equivalent:
Clearly,
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that
The facts max (32) for 0 < ρ < 0.3.
• For 0.3 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.6, it is sufficient to find α, β and γ such that 1 < α + β + γ and
We prove (36) (33)- (35), we obtain that
Hence, Hence, (similar to the computations above),
We prove (38) 
(ii) Now, we prove that 0 < Z (d) for all ρ, 0 < d ≤ 1 2 and ν 1 ≤ ν 0 = f (3). We see that
We substitute A(d, ρ) and B(d, ρ) and obtain
Proof of Corollary 2.8 By (29),
Proof of Corollary 2.9 Now, we compare the profit with equal service rates Z(
2 ) and with different service rates Z(µ 1 , µ 2 ). The following inequalities are equivalent (for 0 < d 2 ≤ 1/2),
By the inequality 1 − (42),
completing the proof of (16) . By (42),
In this case, we compute the optimal
Since ρ 2ρ+1 , ρ 2 + ρ − ρ, → 1/2 as ρ → ∞, we obtain, for ρ sufficiently large, the optimal solution of Z(µ 1 , µ 2 ) is close to µ 1 = µ 2 as we please.
It is trivial to see that if
and this completes the proof. 2 , and π 3 , the limiting probability that the system is empty, the fast server serves a customer, the slow server serves a customer, and the system contains two customers, respectively. The equations for our birthdeath system (similar to [22] page 90) are
We divide these equations by µ and denote
We write the equations system, Aπ = α. Hence, A T Aπ = A T α and π = (A T A) −1 A T α. We confirmed via numerical computations that the optimal profit is obtained for identical servers. We now assume that f (2) ≤ ν e < f (3). By Theorem 2.5, Z(2) ≥ Z(µ 1 , µ 2 ) for every a partition of the total capacity. By Theorem 2.10, Z(3) ≥ Z(µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ). By Theorem 2.3, Z(2) ≥ Z(3) and Z(2) ≥ Z(1). Hence, Z(2) is the optimal solution for all ν e satisfies the condition f (2) ≤ ν e ≤ f (3). Now, we deal with ν e satisfies the condition f (3) ≤ ν e < f (4). By Theorem 2.10, Z(3) ≥ Z(µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 ) and by Theorem 2.3, Z(3) ≥ Z(2). It only remains to prove that Z(3) ≥ Z(µ 1 , µ 2 ). We confirmed this, via numerical computations.
Proof of Lemma 2.12 We prove this lemma by induction.
Step1 For k = 2,
Let U be the minimal between the service times of the two servers, and Z be the service time of the fast server. It is well known that, U ∼ exp(µ 1 + µ 2 ) and Z ∼ exp(µ 1 ). We write
} is Bernoulli random variable with success probability
, and present the distribution functions:
Now, we compute the density of W S at x via convolution between Since the probability P (I { } Z = 0)(µ 1 + µ 2 )e −(µ 1 +µ 2 )x = µ 2 µ 1 + µ 2 (µ 1 + µ 2 )e −(µ 1 +µ 2 )x = µ 2 e −(µ 1 +µ 2 )x , which yields the proof.
Step2 We assume that the theorem is valid for W k−1 S representing the total service time of customer who starts a service at the k − 1st server. Let U k be the minimal service time of k servers, U k ∼ exp(µ 1 + · · · + µ k ). The waiting time for k servers is given by W k S = U k + I . We compute the density of W k S :
Since the probability P (I Hence,
where u l are coefficients of the random variables exp( l i=1 µ i ), l = 1, . . . , k. By the following 
hence, the profit is
We use Corollary 2.13 again. Recall that the expectation of total service time of a customer who begins service by slowest server is equal to k µ for all µ (like servers with equal service rates). Of course, the total service time of the other servers is smaller.
Therefore (π k is the probability corresponding to equal service rates), ∀µ
In a similar way, it is immediate that if the system is not empty the servers with rate µ * = (µ, 0, ..., 0) always give service with total rate µ. Hence,
which yields the proof. 2
Proof of Corollary 2. 15 We showed that the optimal solution is a single server with k − 1 standby positions and this is exactly as an M/M/1 queue with buffer size k − 1. Therefore, the optimal solution k * is equal to n r where n r is the profit maximizing buffer size in Naor's model [31] . Acknowledgments This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation grants no. 526/08 and 1015/11. We thank Gail Gilboa-Freedman for her inspiring discussions.
